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MICROSOFT VERSUS NETSCAPE: A CASE STUDY OF 
GAMES BUSINESSES PLAY 
Esteban Lizano and Margaret Chapman* and Carolyn Stumph* 
Department of Economics, Illinois Wesleyan University 
Game theory is a formalized way of analyzing interactions between rational players 
in hopes of "solving" the game, or finding a solution that optimizes outcomes for 
both players given each others strategies. This framework is used to analyze the 
interactions and strategies of the two main providers of Internet Browsing Software, 
i.e. Microsoft (Internet Explorer) and Netscape (Netscape Navigator.) Since both of 
these firms price their product close to zero, and given that marginal costs approach 
zero, they are using competitive short run pricing. Focusing on pricing to study 
strategic behavior ignores that both firms must price to cover sunk costs over the 
long run and that revenue proceeding from sale of the product is not the main 
source to c.()ver this cost. Therefore, pricing of the software itself is not the essential 
element in the players' strategies. This game will therefore be constructed and 
solved as a dynamic repeated game, using market share and research and 
development expenditure as the principal strategic variables to study the behavior 
of both firms from 1993 to the present. 
